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Con impuestos más altos: ¿todas las empresas ganan?

Author

Listed:
  • Julio César Arteaga García.

    (Facultad de Economía, Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León.)

  • Daniel Flores Curiel

    (Facultad de Economía, Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León.)

Abstract

En este trabajo, se consideran empresas que participan simultáneamente en dos mercados relacionados y se comportan como duopolistas tipo Cournot. Se supone que las funciones de demanda son lineales y que los bienes en ambos mercados son sustitutos brutos. También suponemos que el gobierno implementa un impuesto específico (por unidad) en los bienes producidos en un mercado. Bajo estas condiciones, se muestra que un incremento en el monto del impuesto puede generar mayores ganancias totales para las empresas participantes. Por otra parte, se presenta el escenario en el que siendo una de las empresas monopolista en el mercado en donde se aplica el impuesto, no es posible que ambas empresas obtengan mayores ganancias.

Suggested Citation

  • Julio César Arteaga García. & Daniel Flores Curiel, 2005. "Con impuestos más altos: ¿todas las empresas ganan?," Ensayos Revista de Economia, Universidad Autonoma de Nuevo Leon, Facultad de Economia, vol. 0(2), pages 1-14, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:ere:journl:v:xxiv:y:2005:i:2:p:1-14
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Anderson, Simon P. & de Palma, Andre & Kreider, Brent, 2001. "Tax incidence in differentiated product oligopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 173-192, August.
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