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E-commerce and parcel delivery: environmental policy with green consumers

Author

Listed:
  • Cremer, Helmuth
  • Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie
  • Borsenberger, Claire
  • Joram, Denis
  • Malavolti, Estelle

Abstract

We study how consumers’ environmental awareness (CEA) affects the design of environmental policy in the e-commerce sector. We also examine if there is a need for regulation requiring delivery operators to reveal their emissions. We consider a model with two retailers who sell a differentiated product and two parcel delivery operators. Delivery generates CO2 emissions and their total level creates a global (atmosphere) externality. We assume that it is more expensive for the delivery operator to use less polluting technologies. We consider different scenarios reflecting the type of competition and the vertical structure of the industry. We shown that CEA mitigates the inefficiency of the equilibrium by bringing the level of emissions closer to its optimal level. This is true under perfect and imperfect competition. This efficiency enhancing effect of CEA also affects the design of emissions taxes, which leads to an amended Pigouvian rule. Under perfect competition the tax is reduced by exactly the level of CEA expressed in monetary terms. Under imperfect competition the adjustment exceeds this level.

Suggested Citation

  • Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Borsenberger, Claire & Joram, Denis & Malavolti, Estelle, 2022. "E-commerce and parcel delivery: environmental policy with green consumers," TSE Working Papers 22-1318, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:126748
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Consumers' environmental awareness; Pigouvian rule; emission taxes; e-commerce; parcel delivery operators; vertical integration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
    • L87 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Postal and Delivery Services

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