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Unhelpful Abstractions and the Standard View

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  • Cass R. Sunstein

Abstract

It is not fruitful to puzzle over the question whether economists and others ‘favor’ or ‘lean’ toward the regulatory or welfare state; that is an unhelpful and confusing question, one that orients people in the wrong way. It is better to begin by emphasizing that the first should be designed to handle market failures, and that the second should be designed to respond to economic deprivation and unjustified inequality.

Suggested Citation

  • Cass R. Sunstein, 2015. "Unhelpful Abstractions and the Standard View," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 12(1), pages 68-71, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ejw:journl:v:12:y:2015:i:1:p:68-71
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, 2023. "Libertarian paternalism," Chapters, in: Cass R. Sunstein & Lucia A. Reisch (ed.), Research Handbook on Nudges and Society, chapter 1, pages 10-16, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 2000. "Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 821-835, June.
    3. Sanchirico, Chris William, 2000. "Taxes versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 797-820, June.
    4. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 667-681, June.
    5. Sunstein, Cass R., 2014. "Valuing Life," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226780177.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Welfare state; regulatory state; regulation; redistribution; economists;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics

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