Risk Aversion, the Hand Rule, and Comparison between Strict Liability and the Negligence Rule
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2015-0016
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More about this item
Keywords
risk aversion; Hand rule; strict liability; negligence rule; social welfare;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
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