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Inhibited privatization: a hurdle race over vested interests

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  • Marcin Senderski

    (Kozminski University)

Abstract

This paper recognizes vested interests as one of the primary premises that reduce the effectiveness of privatization policy, stall its momentum and produce structural problems in the long-run. Both exogenous and endogenous drawbacks are cited, but the main focus is put on the dynamism of vested interests’ character, interconnectedness and evolution. Policy makers have been long aware of the existence of activities rooted in vested interests including empire building behaviors, creation of sinecures or extravagant management style. Hence, the fundamental effort here is put on the identification of emerging vested interests that were typically not considered by scholars. The channels through which conventional vested interests have snowballed over time are emphasized. This includes casting a closer glance at family employment, as well as at sports sponsorship arrangements, which emerge as the favorite domain of marketing activity for Polish state-owned enterprises. The research of available literature is performed, along with its application to the Polish case, and insightful observations concerning the anatomy of privatization-related reluctance. Rough policy recommendations conclude the paper.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcin Senderski, 2015. "Inhibited privatization: a hurdle race over vested interests," European Journal of Government and Economics, Europa Grande, vol. 4(1), pages 46-66, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:egr:ejge00:v:4:i:1:p:46-66
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    privatization; Poland; vested interests; state-owned enterprises;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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