Modern Russian corporate governance: convergent forces or product of Russia's history?

Does Russian corporate governance in the new millennium amount to a gradual evolution towards US-style corporate governance, or can it be expected to continue to reflect historical institutions and national culture? When multinationals complain about State interference in firms' strategies and operations, can this be a permanent state of affairs, or is the situation likely to change? After 1991, Russia, in the middle of a huge crisis, embarked on a program of mass privatization, ostensibly with a view to creating full, market-based corporate governance, with open information disclosure, and enterprise ownership by outside investors having no relationship with the firm other then through their shares. In practice, however, it has become clear that a very different pattern has emerged, especially in manufacturing industries with relational investors, including managers and employees, as well as banks and other firms linked horizontally or vertically, little share liquidity. There is continued hostility towards active western and other genuinely 'outside' investors, and persistently strong State influence. This paper argues that this outcome can only be understood in the context of business history.