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The benefits of cooperative policies for transportation network protection from sea level rise: A case study of the San Francisco Bay Area

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  • Madanat, Samer Michel
  • Papakonstantinou, Ilia
  • Lee, Jinwoo

Abstract

This research investigates the influence of decision-maker behavior on policies that are likely to be adopted for the protection of highway infrastructure against inundations resulting from sea level rise. We analyze two different types of games to represent decision-maker behavior, and use the San Francisco Bay Area shoreline with a scenario of a 0.5 m sea level rise as a case study, which is expected in 2054. In our model, the objective of the decision-makers (the counties bordering the SF Bay Area) is to minimize the traffic delay caused by inundations in the transportation network that lies in the geographical boundaries of their counties.

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  • Madanat, Samer Michel & Papakonstantinou, Ilia & Lee, Jinwoo, 2019. "The benefits of cooperative policies for transportation network protection from sea level rise: A case study of the San Francisco Bay Area," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 1-9.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:trapol:v:76:y:2019:i:c:p:a1-a9
    DOI: 10.1016/j.tranpol.2018.12.011
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    Cited by:

    1. Sun, Jiayun & Chow, Aaron C.H. & Madanat, Samer Michel, 2021. "Equity concerns in transportation infrastructure protection against sea level rise," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 81-88.
    2. Sun, Jiayun & Chow, Aaron C.H. & Michel Madanat, Samer, 2022. "Tradeoffs between optimality and equity in transportation network protection against sea level rise," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 195-208.

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