Should ports expand their facilities under congestion and uncertainty?

This paper investigates simultaneous facility investments of risk-averse ports under congestion and uncertain market demand. We set up a two-period game, allowing two ports first choose their facility investment levels, and then decide their cargo-handling amounts and service prices. When investment costs of the two ports are large, the unique equilibrium is no investment. If investment costs of at least one port are small, then one or two ports will invest at equilibria. If both ports invest at equilibrium, they may become worse off than at non-equilibrium of no investment. This means that the ports may face a tradeoff between stability and efficiency. Moreover, we compare the behaviors of risk-averse and risk-neutral ports, as well as risk-averse ports’ behaviors under uncertainty and no-uncertainty. It is found that ports’ risk-averse degrees are the major factor determining their behaviors in different scenarios.