IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/transb/v38y2004i2p123-146.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Performance-based quality contracts for the bus sector: delivering social and commercial value for money

Author

Listed:
  • Hensher, David A.
  • Houghton, Erne

Abstract

Reform of the bus sector has been occurring in many countries. One matter central to these reform initiatives is the establishment of a value for money (VM) regime to ensure that operators deliver to the market the best possible service levels consistent with stakeholder needs, and especially with the objectives of government. A key underlying feature of VM is identifying the benefit to society associated with each dollar of subsidy support from government. This paper reviews the elements of a VM regime within the setting of an incentive-based performance contract, and develops a formal framework for establishing optimum subsidy based on system-wide maximisation of social surplus. The maximisation of social surplus is subject to a number of constraints, including the commercial imperative of the operator, minimum service levels under community service obligations (CSO), and a fare and subsidy budget cap. An important feature of the performance-based contract (PBC) regime is a passenger trip-based incentive payment scheme linked to user and externality benefits that incorporates a subsidy per additional passenger trip above the patronage delivered under service and fare levels compliant with CSO. In this way, rewards to operators are revealed through the fare box, through increased consumer surplus and through reductions in negative externalities such as those associated with the use of the car. PBCs can be designed to accommodate both the transition from an existing regime and post-transition growth strategies. The implementation of PBCs is illustrated using data from private operators in the Sydney Metropolitan Area.

Suggested Citation

  • Hensher, David A. & Houghton, Erne, 2004. "Performance-based quality contracts for the bus sector: delivering social and commercial value for money," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 123-146, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:transb:v:38:y:2004:i:2:p:123-146
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191-2615(03)00004-3
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David A. Hensher & Paola Prioni, 2002. "A Service Quality Index for Area-wide Contract Performance Assessment," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 36(1), pages 93-113, January.
    2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
    3. David Hensher, 2002. "A Systematic Assessment of the Environmental Impacts of Transport Policy," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(1), pages 185-217, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hensher, David A., 2007. "Bus transport: Economics, policy and planning," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-507, January.
    2. Ida, Yoram & Talit, Gal, 2015. "Regulation of public bus services: The Israeli experience," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 156-165.
    3. Sheng, Dian & Meng, Qiang, 2020. "Public bus service contracting: A critical review and future research opportunities," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    4. Evangelinos, Christos, 2013. "Infrastrukturpreise: Eine normativ-theoretische Analyse," Discussion Papers 1/2013, Technische Universität Dresden, "Friedrich List" Faculty of Transport and Traffic Sciences, Institute of Transport and Economics.
    5. Klein, Michael, 1996. "Competition in network industries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1591, The World Bank.
    6. Rodrigo M. S. Moita & Claudio Paiva, 2013. "Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 94-121, February.
    7. MARINI, Marco, 1996. "Property Rights and Market : Employee Privatization as a Cooperative Bargaining Process," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1996023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    8. Henrekson, Magnus & Johansson, Dan, 2010. "Firm Growth, Institutions and Structural Transformation," Ratio Working Papers 150, The Ratio Institute.
    9. Simon P. Anderson & Régis Renault, 2011. "Price Discrimination," Chapters, in: André de Palma & Robin Lindsey & Emile Quinet & Roger Vickerman (ed.), A Handbook of Transport Economics, chapter 22, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Yuzhou Jiang & Ramteen Sioshansi, 2023. "What Duality Theory Tells Us About Giving Market Operators the Authority to Dispatch Energy Storage," The Energy Journal, , vol. 44(3), pages 89-110, May.
    11. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    12. David Martimort & Flavio Menezes & Myrna Wooders & ELISABETTA IOSSA & DAVID MARTIMORT, 2015. "The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(1), pages 4-48, February.
    13. Bassanini, Anna & Pouyet, Jerome, 2005. "Strategic choice of financing systems in regulated and interconnected industries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2-3), pages 233-259, February.
    14. Koo, Tay T.R. & Wu, Cheng-Lung (Richard) & Dwyer, Larry, 2010. "Ground travel mode choices of air arrivals at regional destinations: The significance of tourism attributes and destination contexts," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 44-53.
    15. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, 2008. "Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 171-191, January.
    16. Daron Acemoglu & Amy Finkelstein, 2008. "Input and Technology Choices in Regulated Industries: Evidence from the Health Care Sector," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(5), pages 837-880, October.
    17. Agiakloglou, Christos & Gkouvakis, Michail, 2015. "Causal interrelations among market fundamentals: Evidence from the European Telecommunications sector," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 150-159.
    18. Lehmann, Markus A., 2002. "Error minimization and deterrence in agency control," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 373-391, May.
    19. Strausz, Roland, 2006. "Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal-agent models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 306-314, May.
    20. Urrunaga, Roberto & Aparicio, Carlos, 2012. "Infrastructure and economic growth in Peru," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), August.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:transb:v:38:y:2004:i:2:p:123-146. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/548/description#description .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.