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The paradigm logic of blockchain governance

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  • Jin, Sheng

Abstract

Blockchain technology is mainly composed of public-key cryptography, hash algorithms and consensus mechanisms. Blockchain solves the two trust problems inherent in human interaction: the Byzantine Generals Problem and the Prisoner's Dilemma, which allows blockchain to replace the function of public power as a centre of trust to a certain extent, and also enables it to become a kind of decentralised large-scale collaborative infrastructure for human beings. Blockchain itself has a strong escape from public power, and the blockchain order is also non-rational. Its emergence has impacted the traditional constructivist-rationalism governance paradigm. Current research exploring blockchain governance issues at the level of governance paradigms is still limited. This study mainly adopts a normative analysis methodology, firstly outlining the decentralised technology model of blockchain and the economic ecosystem model built on top of this technology model. Secondly, this study explores the ontology of blockchain technology and its economic model on a philosophical level as well as the philosophical roots of the limitations of the traditional governance paradigm when confronted with blockchain governance. On this basis, this study further proposes ideas for shifting the blockchain governance paradigm. Specifically, it includes that a judicature-based governance paradigm should be established while the executive power should shift to focus on the issue of equality on the blockchain, and in the context of weakly centralised legislation, soft law governance should be allowed to play more of a role. Considering the popularity and development of blockchain technology, this study provides insights into the theoretical level of blockchain governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Jin, Sheng, 2024. "The paradigm logic of blockchain governance," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:teinso:v:78:y:2024:i:c:s0160791x2400229x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.techsoc.2024.102681
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    References listed on IDEAS

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