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Corporate Capture of Blockchain Governance

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Ferreira

    (London School of Economics, CEPR and ECGI)

  • Jin Li

    (Hong Kong University, CEP)

  • Radoslawa Nikolowa

    (Queen Mary University of London)

Abstract

We develop a theory of blockchain governance. In our model, the proof-of-work system, which is the most common set of rules for validating transactions in blockchains, creates an industrial ecosystem with specialized suppliers of goods and services. We analyze the two-way interactions between blockchain governance and the market structure of the industries in the blockchain ecosystem. Our main result is that the proof-of-work system leads to a situation where the governance of the blockchain is captured by a large firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Ferreira & Jin Li & Radoslawa Nikolowa, 2019. "Corporate Capture of Blockchain Governance," Working Papers 880, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    • Handle: RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:880
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Lambrecht, Marco & Sofianos, Andis & Xu, Yilong, 2020. "Does mining fuel bubbles? An experimental study on cryptocurrency markets," Working Papers 0690, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    8. Thong, Lik Hong, 2019. "A discussion on performance risk of Dunkin's Brand," MPRA Paper 97266, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 Nov 2019.
    9. Fahad Asghar & Palwasha Farooq & Muhammad Nadim & Zain ul Abidin & Fazli Wadood, 2023. "Global Financial Crisis: A critical study on Role of Auditor’s and Stakeholder," Journal of Policy Research (JPR), Research Foundation for Humanity (RFH), vol. 9(2), pages 452-458.
    10. Igor Makarov & Antoinette Schoar, 2022. "Cryptocurrencies and Decentralised Finance," BIS Working Papers 1061, Bank for International Settlements.
    11. Olfa Ben Salah, 2024. "Analyzing the Causal Relationship Between Tax Avoidance and Earnings Management: Evidence from The STOXX Europe 600 Index," Journal of Accounting and Management Information Systems, Faculty of Accounting and Management Information Systems, The Bucharest University of Economic Studies, vol. 23(1), pages 29-49, January.
    12. Yuanyuan Wang & Jijie Ma & Kun Zhang, 2024. "Can digital transformation reduce corporate illegality?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 1090-1109, July.
    13. Dutta, Pankaj & Choi, Tsan-Ming & Somani, Surabhi & Butala, Richa, 2020. "Blockchain technology in supply chain operations: Applications, challenges and research opportunities," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
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    15. Li Mingqian, 2024. "Why Transaction Cost Economics Failed and How to Fix It," Papers 2405.09087, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
    16. Angelo de Sousa Santarlacci & Humberto Angelo & Álvaro Nogueira de Souza & Maria de Fátima de Brito Lima & Maísa Santos Joaquim & Eder Pereira Miguel & Júlia de Oliveira Carneiro, 2024. "Benefit Sharing Governance Framework: Pathways for Financial Benefit Sharing in Traditional Communities," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(7), pages 1-24, March.
    17. Agostino Capponi & Sveinn Olafsson & Humoud Alsabah, 2021. "Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization?," Papers 2106.09783, arXiv.org.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Governance; Blockchain; Proof-of-Work; Industrial Ecosystem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • M20 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - General

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