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Evolutionary effects of non-compliant behavior in public procurement

Author

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  • Brianzoni, Serena
  • Coppier, Raffaella
  • Michetti, Elisabetta

Abstract

The main goal of the present work is to analyze the evolution of non-compliant firms in public procurement. The dynamic setting is formalized by an evolutionary adaptation process which describes whether honest or dishonest behavior prevails in society at any given time. Firms will either behave in an honest or dishonest way depending on the payoffs and the type of firms they meet, through a word-of-mouth process. The honesty propensity assumption is introduced. By making use of both analytical tools and numerical techniques, we show that monomorphic configurations may represent stable or unstable equilibria, while coexistence of both groups in the steady state is possible and its asymptotic stability is sensitive to parameter modifications. Moreover, a rich variety of integrated dynamic behavior can be observed due to different kinds of bifurcations, smooth or border collision. A social planner can evaluate social and/or fiscal policies to manipulate preferences for honest behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Brianzoni, Serena & Coppier, Raffaella & Michetti, Elisabetta, 2019. "Evolutionary effects of non-compliant behavior in public procurement," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 106-118.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:streco:v:51:y:2019:i:c:p:106-118
    DOI: 10.1016/j.strueco.2019.08.008
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    Cited by:

    1. Raffaella Coppier & Francesca Grassetti & Elisabetta Michetti, 2021. "Non-compliant behaviour in public procurement: an evolutionary model with endogenous monitoring," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 44(1), pages 459-483, June.
    2. Bischi, Gian Italo & Matsumoto, Akio & Carrera, Edgar J. Sanchez, 2020. "Foreword to the SCED special issue on “Nonlinear Social Dynamics”," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 236-237.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Complex dynamics; Multiple equilibria; Procurement; Word of mouth; Evolutionary game; Non-compliant behavior;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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