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Sustainable cooperation in the watershed ecological compensation public-private partnership project: Lessons from China's Chishui river basin

Author

Listed:
  • Jiang, Ke
  • Zhang, Jiaming
  • Zhang, Leilei
  • Wang, Die
  • Wang, Yusheng

Abstract

The public-private partnership (PPP) has emerged as a promising financing approach to effectively alleviate the financial burden on governments involved in watershed ecological compensation (WEC) projects. This study specifically focuses on the WECPPP project in China's Chishui River Basin (CSRB) and employs a tripartite evolutionary game model to examine sustainable cooperative behavior among social capital, governmental regulatory entity, and the general public. To ascertain the evolutionary stability strategy (ESS), replicated dynamic equations and equilibrium point stability analysis are then solved. Lastly, a numerical illustration grounded in the WECPPP-CSRB project is utilized as empirical evidence to validate the theoretical findings and substantiate ensuing recognitions: the game model elucidates the presence of eight equilibrium points, while delineating four potential ESSs, each discerned through stakeholder-oriented cost-benefit assessments; stringent government regulations play a pivotal role in coordinating stakeholder interests in the WECPPP-CSRB project, thereby safeguarding both ecological integrity and economic gains; and the optimization of the income distribution mechanism coupled with the augmentation of performance-linked subsidies is acknowledged as imperative measures for ensuring the long-term viability of the WECPPP-CSRB project. The findings thus not only provide a comprehensive analysis of the effective approach and insights into fostering sustainable cooperation among multiple stakeholders in the WECPPP project, but also proffer invaluable recommendations for enhancing incentives, refining regulatory frameworks, and attaining favorable market outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiang, Ke & Zhang, Jiaming & Zhang, Leilei & Wang, Die & Wang, Yusheng, 2023. "Sustainable cooperation in the watershed ecological compensation public-private partnership project: Lessons from China's Chishui river basin," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceps:v:90:y:2023:i:c:s0038012123002422
    DOI: 10.1016/j.seps.2023.101730
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