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Solving the problem of maximizing diversity in public sector teams

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  • Talmor, Irit

Abstract

Diverse representation in public sector teams is important for the transparent and fair conduct of a democratic society. The problem, especially when creating a large number of teams, is how to efficiently assign employees to teams in a way that reflects the diversity of interests in the organization, and in society at large.

Suggested Citation

  • Talmor, Irit, 2022. "Solving the problem of maximizing diversity in public sector teams," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceps:v:81:y:2022:i:c:s003801212100183x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.seps.2021.101191
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    References listed on IDEAS

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