Charity, incentives, and performance
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DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2016.04.005
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- Schwartz, Daniel & Keenan, Elizabeth A. & Imas, Alex & Gneezy, Ayelet, 2021. "Opting-in to prosocial incentives," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 132-141.
- Bernhard E. Reichert & Matthias Sohn, 2022. "How Corporate Charitable Giving Reduces the Costs of Formal Controls," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 176(4), pages 689-704, April.
- Daniel Schwartz & Elizabeth A. Keenan & Alex Imas & Ayelet Gneezy, 2017. "Opting-in to Prosocial Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 6840, CESifo.
- Thomas D. Shohfi & Roger M. White, 2020. "The dark side of individual blockholder philanthropy," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 49(3), pages 741-767, September.
- Fang, Xing, 2022. "Why we hide good deeds? The selfless and anonymous donation behavior in crowdfunding," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Charity; Incomplete contracts; Experiments;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
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