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Does an educated mind take the broader view? A field experiment on in-group favouritism among microcredit clients

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  • Kolstad, Ivar
  • Wiig, Arne

Abstract

A number of studies document an in-group bias in social dilemma situations. While group structure and dynamics are important in shaping in-group favouritism, less attention has been paid to individual characteristics affecting favouritism. Using data from dictator games conducted among 523 microcredit clients in Angola, this paper analyzes the effect of education on in-group favouritism. When addressing the endogeneity of education, we find that education increases in-group bias. This goes against the conventional view that education broadens the perspectives of an individual. In addition, our results suggest that in-group favouritism is related to gender, family background and access to particular forms of networks.

Suggested Citation

  • Kolstad, Ivar & Wiig, Arne, 2013. "Does an educated mind take the broader view? A field experiment on in-group favouritism among microcredit clients," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 10-17.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:45:y:2013:i:c:p:10-17
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2013.02.021
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    Cited by:

    1. Ivar Kolstad & Armando J. Garcia Pires & Arne Wiig, 2017. "Within-group heterogeneity and group dynamics: analyzing exit of microcredit groups in Angola," Oxford Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(3), pages 338-351, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    In-group favouritism; Parochialism; Field experiment; Social preferences; Microcredit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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