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A theory of norm compliance: Punishment and reputation

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  • Teraji, Shinji

Abstract

Why do not social norms simply collapse from the violation? This paper analyzes two distinct mechanisms on norm compliance: punishment and reputation. The model considers two groups of agents in a society with one norm. Agents in one group choose whether to comply with the norm, while agents in the other group potentially punish opponents who violate the norm. The paper investigates two scenarios to account for the long-run stability of the norm. In one scenario, the norm is enforced due to a higher level of punishment of the violation. In another scenario, everyone is motivated due to reputation formation, despite a lower level of punishment by others. The interaction of two mechanisms provides a convenient way to norm compliance.

Suggested Citation

  • Teraji, Shinji, 2013. "A theory of norm compliance: Punishment and reputation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 1-6.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:44:y:2013:i:c:p:1-6
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2013.01.008
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    Cited by:

    1. Thommes, Kirsten & Vyrastekova, Jana & Akkerman, Agnes, 2015. "Behavioral spillovers from freeriding in multilevel interactions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 78-87.
    2. Sprengholz, Philipp & Bruckmann, Robert & Wiedermann, Marc & Brockmann, Dirk & Betsch, Cornelia, 2023. "From delta to omicron: The role of individual factors and social context in self-reported compliance with pandemic regulations and recommendations," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 317(C).
    3. Sanae Tashiro & Chu-Ping Lo, 2020. "When Social Norms Influence the Employment of Women: The Case of Japan," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 46(3), pages 460-482, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Norm; Compliance; Punishment; Reputation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

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