It is not just escalation: The one dollar game revisited
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DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2011.05.012
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Cited by:
- Andrea Morone & Simone Nuzzo & Rocco Caferra, 2019.
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Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 79-98, February.
- Morone, Andrea & Nuzzo, Simone & Caferra, Rocco, 2016. "The Dollar Auction Game: A laboratory comparison between Individuals and Groups," MPRA Paper 72608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Morone, Andrea & Nuzzo, Simone & Caferra, Rocco, 2017. "The Dollar Auction Game: A laboratory comparison between Individuals and Groups," EconStor Preprints 170728, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- Matteo Migheli, 2017. "The winner’s curse in auctions with losses," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 16(1), pages 113-126, November.
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More about this item
Keywords
One-dollar game; Sealed auction; Rationality; Experiment;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
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