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Enfranchisement and the welfare state: Institutional design of unemployment compensation

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  • Kim, Wonik

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between various political mechanisms and the variation in unemployment compensation programs (i.e., compulsory, voluntary, and assistance programs). I argue that the choice of a specific unemployment compensation program over others depends on the level of franchise extension. Using a multinomial logit analysis of 13 European countries from 1880 to 1945, I find that among other political mechanisms, franchise extension had the greatest impact on the likelihood of instituting unemployment compensation, controlling socio-economic factors. Greater enfranchisement is associated with a higher probability of choosing a compulsory program, but not a voluntary one.

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  • Kim, Wonik, 2008. "Enfranchisement and the welfare state: Institutional design of unemployment compensation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 1660-1678, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:37:y:2008:i:4:p:1660-1678
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    References listed on IDEAS

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