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How do partial acquisitions affect the wealth of acquiring firms? The case of Japanese firms

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  • Otsubo, Minoru

Abstract

This study examines how and why partial acquisitions affect the wealth of acquiring firms in Japan. Few studies have focused on acquiring firms in partial acquisitions, whereas many studies have investigated target firms. The empirical results show that the shareholder wealth of acquiring firms, which can increase through partial acquisitions, is much lower than that of target firms. In addition, acquiring firms and their targets differ in how they enhance their wealth from partial acquisitions—acquiring firms can enhance their wealth by exploiting the wealth of target firms, while target firms can enhance their wealth by obtaining support from acquiring firms.

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  • Otsubo, Minoru, 2021. "How do partial acquisitions affect the wealth of acquiring firms? The case of Japanese firms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:58:y:2021:i:c:s0275531921001173
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2021.101496
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Partial acquisition; Blockholder; Synergy; Equity alliance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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