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The political economy of intergovernmental grants

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  • Borck, Rainald
  • Owings, Stephanie

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  • Borck, Rainald & Owings, Stephanie, 2003. "The political economy of intergovernmental grants," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 139-156, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:33:y:2003:i:2:p:139-156
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    1. Douglas Hart & Michael Munger, 1989. "Declining electoral competitiveness in the House of Representatives: The differential impact of improved transportation technology," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 217-228, June.
    2. Johansson, E., 1999. "Intergovernmental Grants As A Tactical Instrument: Some Empirical Evidence from Swedish Municipalities," Papers 1999:10, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
    3. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 623-646, May.
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    5. Robert P. Inman, 1988. "Federal Assistance and Local Services in the United States: The Evolution of a New," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Federalism: Quantitative Studies, pages 33-78, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Wallace E. Oates & Wallace E. Oates, 2004. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 22, pages 384-414, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-927, October.
    8. Ashenfelter, Orley C & Kelley, Stanley, Jr, 1975. "Determinants of Participation in Presidential Elections," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 695-733, December.
    9. Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1999. "Gerontocracy, Retirement, and Social Security," NBER Working Papers 7117, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Mulligan, Casey B. & Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, 1999. "Gerontocracy, Retirement, and Social Security," Working Papers 154, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    11. Levitt, Steven D & Snyder, James M, Jr, 1997. "The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 30-53, February.
    12. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    13. Grossman, Philip J, 1994. "A Political Theory of Intergovernmental Grants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(3-4), pages 295-303, March.
    14. Dixit, Avinash & Londregan, John, 1998. "Fiscal federalism and redistributive politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 153-180, May.
    15. Harvey S. Rosen, 1988. "Fiscal Federalism: Quantitative Studies," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number rose88-1.
    16. Homburg, Stefan, 1997. "Ursachen und Wirkungen eines zwischenstaatlichen Finanzausgleichs," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 61-95.
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