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Rational Abstention and the Congressional Vote Choice

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  • L. S. Rothenberg
  • M. Sanders

Abstract

Research on voting, particularly on legislative behavior, tends to focus on the choices of those casting ballots. Yet, intuitively, abstentions and vote choice should be jointly determined. As such, the relevance of participation depends upon both the extent to which it can be explained by the costs and the benefits of voting and on the nature of the interactions between participation and preferences. To this end, we provide a framework for explaining roll call behavior that simultaneously considers legislators’ decisions about whether and how to vote. Application to roll call voting in the 104th Congress finds that abstention and voting choices are integrated; our approach generates sensible and substantively important results which yield important insights into legislative behavior and public policy.

Suggested Citation

  • L. S. Rothenberg & M. Sanders, 1999. "Rational Abstention and the Congressional Vote Choice," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 311-340, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:3:p:311-340
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00064
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    Cited by:

    1. Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas, 2007. "Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(3), pages 409-424, August.
    2. Zoltán Fazekas & Martin Ejnar Hansen, 2022. "Incentives for non-participation: absence in the United Kingdom House of Commons, 1997–2015," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 51-73, April.
    3. Muro, Sergio & Chehtman, Alejandro, 2020. "Law or strategic calculus? Abstention in the Argentine Supreme Court," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    4. Marco Battaglini & Valerio Leone Sciabolazza & Eleonora Patacchini, 2020. "Abstentions and Social Networks in Congress," NBER Working Papers 27822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. James Lo, 2013. "Voting Present," SAGE Open, , vol. 3(4), pages 21582440135, December.
    6. Borck, Rainald & Owings, Stephanie, 2003. "The political economy of intergovernmental grants," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 139-156, March.
    7. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2008:i:25:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Cloléry, Héloïse, 2023. "Legislators in the crossfire: Strategic non-voting and the effect of transparency," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    9. Neil Longley, 2003. "Modeling the Legislator as an Agent for the Party: The Effects of Strict Party Discipline on Legislator Voting Behavior," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 21(4), pages 490-499, October.
    10. Monika Mühlböck & Nikoleta Yordanova, 2017. "When legislators choose not to decide: Abstentions in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 18(2), pages 323-336, June.
    11. Jacobi, Tonja & Kontorovich, Eugene, 2015. "Why judges always vote," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 190-199.

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