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A model of selective tendering: Does bidding competition deter opportunism by contractors?

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  • Kim, In-Gyu

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  • Kim, In-Gyu, 1998. "A model of selective tendering: Does bidding competition deter opportunism by contractors?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 907-925.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:38:y:1998:i:4:p:907-925
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    1. Patricia M. Hillebrandt, 1974. "Economic Theory and the Construction Industry," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-01927-4, December.
    2. Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Auctions versus Negotiations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 180-194, March.
    3. Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1992. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 566-578, June.
    4. Steve Kelman, 1990. "Procurement and Public Management," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 53122, September.
    5. French, Kenneth R & McCormick, Robert E, 1984. "Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the Process of Competition," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(4), pages 417-441, October.
    6. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, Joan G, 1985. "Auction Theory with Private Values," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 150-155, May.
    7. Carl Shapiro, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(4), pages 659-679.
    8. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
    9. Kim, In-Gyu, 1994. "Price-preference vs. tariff policies in government procurement auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 217-222, June.
    10. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Procurement and Renegotiation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 235-259, April.
    11. Kim, In-Gyu, 1997. "Government procurement and asymmetric rebate auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 245-250, July.
    12. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(1), pages 1-26.
    13. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    14. Tracy R. Lewis, 1986. "Reputation and Contractual Performance in Long-Term Projects," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 141-157, Summer.
    15. Holt, Charles A, Jr, 1980. "Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction Procedures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 433-445, June.
    16. Spulber, Daniel F, 1990. "Auctions and Contract Enforcement," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 325-344, Fall.
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    Cited by:

    1. Guido Tatone, 2018. "La reputazione negli appalti pubblici: uno strumento socialmente desiderabile per risolvere il problema dello scadimento qualitativo," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2018(1), pages 59-85.
    2. Decio Coviello & Andrea Guglielmo & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2015. "The Effect of Discretion on Procurement Performance," CEIS Research Paper 361, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 17 Nov 2015.
    3. Freddy Huet & Simon Porcher, 2013. "Innovation and regulatory outcomes: evidence from the public-private contracts for water supply in France," Chapters, in: Mehmet Ugur (ed.), Governance, Regulation and Innovation, chapter 9, pages 216-236, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Cesi Berardino & Iozzi Alberto & Valentini Edilio, 2012. "Regulating Unverifiable Quality by Fixed-Price Contracts," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-39, September.
    5. Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2014. "Building Reputation For Contract Renewal: Implications For Performance Dynamics And Contract Duration," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 549-574, June.
    6. Albano, Gian Luigi & Cesi, Berardino & Iozzi, Alberto, 2017. "Public procurement with unverifiable quality: The case for discriminatory competitive procedures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 14-26.
    7. Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1992. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 566-578, June.
    8. Guido Tatone, 2016. "L?influenza dell?enforcement contrattuale sulla qualit? della prestazione negli appalti pubblici: una rassegna teorica," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2016(2), pages 107-129.
    9. Albano, Gian Luigi & Cesi, Berardino, 2008. "Past Performance Evaluation in Repeated Procurement: A Simple Model of Handicapping," Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance Working Papers 6370, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    10. Amaral, Miguel & Saussier, Stéphane & Yvrande-Billon, Anne, 2009. "Auction procedures and competition in public services: The case of urban public transport in France and London," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 166-175, June.
    11. Brosig, Jeannette & Heinrich, Timo, 2011. "Reputation and Mechanism Choice in Procurement Auctions – An Experiment," Ruhr Economic Papers 254, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    12. Gian Luigi Albano & Federico Dini & Roberto Zampino, 2008. "Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence From the Acquisitions of IT Services," Working Papers 2008.86, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    13. Maietta, Ornella Wanda & Gorgitano, Maria Teresa, 2016. "School meals and pupil satisfaction. Evidence from Italian primary schools," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 41-55.
    14. Berardino Cesi & Gian Luigi Albano, 2008. "Past Performance Evaluation in Repeated Procurement: A Simple Model of Handicapping," Working Papers 2008.19, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    15. Gian Luigi Albano & Berardino Cesi & Alberto Iozzi, 2023. "Teaching an old dog a new trick: Reserve price and unverifiable quality in repeated procurement," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 377-399, April.
    16. Albano, Gian Luigi & Dini, Federico & Zampino, Roberto, 2008. "Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence From the Acquisitions of IT Services," Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance Working Papers 46547, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    17. Francesco Decarolis & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Riccardo Pacini, 2016. "Past Performance and Procurement Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 22814, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Maria Teresa Gorgitano & Ornella Wanda Maietta, 2015. "School Meals and Children Satisfaction. Evidence from Italian Primary Schools," CSEF Working Papers 405, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    19. C. Y. Yiu & C. S. Tam, 2006. "Rational under-pricing in bidding strategy: a real options model," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(5), pages 475-484.
    20. repec:zbw:rwirep:0254 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Decio Coviello & Andrea Guglielmo & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2018. "The Effect of Discretion on Procurement Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(2), pages 715-738, February.
    22. Jeanette Brosig & Timo Heinrich, 2011. "Reputation and Mechanism Choice in Procurement Auctions – An Experiment," Ruhr Economic Papers 0254, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    23. Nicola Doni, 2006. "The Importance Of Reputation In Awarding Public Contracts," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(4), pages 401-429, December.

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