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Government procurement and asymmetric rebate auctions

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  • Kim, In-Gyu

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  • Kim, In-Gyu, 1997. "Government procurement and asymmetric rebate auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 245-250, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:54:y:1997:i:3:p:245-250
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kim, In-Gyu, 1994. "Price-preference vs. tariff policies in government procurement auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 217-222, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Colucci, Domenico & Doni, Nicola & Valori, Vincenzo, 2012. "Preferential treatment in procurement auctions through information revelation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 883-886.
    2. Gervan Fearon, 2004. "Public sector wage settlement and the threat of outsourcing," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 32(3), pages 161-174, September.
    3. Kim, In-Gyu, 1998. "A model of selective tendering: Does bidding competition deter opportunism by contractors?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 907-925.

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    1. Kim, In-Gyu, 1998. "A model of selective tendering: Does bidding competition deter opportunism by contractors?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 907-925.
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    5. Weichenrieder, Alfons J., 2001. "Public procurement in the presence of capital taxation," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2-3), pages 339-353, April.

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