Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.028
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- Vincent Meisner & Pascal Pillath, 2024. "Monetizing digital content with network effects: A mechanism-design approach," Papers 2408.15196, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
- Meisner, Vincent & Pillath, Pascal, 2024. "Monetizing digital content with network effects: A mechanism-design approach," VfS Annual Conference 2024 (Berlin): Upcoming Labor Market Challenges 302417, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Vincent Meisner & Pascal Pillath, 2024. "Monetizing digital content with network effects: A mechanism-design approach," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0049, Berlin School of Economics.
- Bierbrauer Felix J., 2016. "Effizienz oder Gerechtigkeit?: Ungleiche Einkommen, ungleiche Vermögen und Optimale Steuern," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 2-24, April.
- Felix Bierbrauer, 2016. "Effizienz oder Gerechtigkeit? Ungleiche Einkommen, ungleiche Vermögen und die Theorie der optimalen Besteuerung," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_03, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
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More about this item
Keywords
Incomplete contracts; Excludable public goods; Regulation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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