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Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods

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  • Bierbrauer, Felix J.

Abstract

We study whether a firm that produces and sells access to an excludable public good should face a self-financing requirement, or, alternatively, receive subsidies that help to cover the cost of public-goods provision. The main result is that the desirability of a self-financing requirement is shaped by an equity-efficiency trade-off: while first-best efficiency is out of reach with such a requirement, its imposition limits the firm's ability of rent extraction. Hence, consumer surplus may be higher if the firm has no access to public funds.

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  • Bierbrauer, Felix J., 2011. "Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 553-569, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:7-8:p:553-569
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    Cited by:

    1. Vincent Meisner & Pascal Pillath, 2024. "Monetizing digital content with network effects: A mechanism-design approach," Papers 2408.15196, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    2. Meisner, Vincent & Pillath, Pascal, 2024. "Monetizing digital content with network effects: A mechanism-design approach," VfS Annual Conference 2024 (Berlin): Upcoming Labor Market Challenges 302417, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Vincent Meisner & Pascal Pillath, 2024. "Monetizing digital content with network effects: A mechanism-design approach," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0049, Berlin School of Economics.
    4. Bierbrauer Felix J., 2016. "Effizienz oder Gerechtigkeit?: Ungleiche Einkommen, ungleiche Vermögen und Optimale Steuern," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 2-24, April.
    5. Felix Bierbrauer, 2016. "Effizienz oder Gerechtigkeit? Ungleiche Einkommen, ungleiche Vermögen und die Theorie der optimalen Besteuerung," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_03, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

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