Interest-group politics under majority rule
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- Dougan, William R. & Snyder, James, 1990. "Interest-Group Politics under Majority Rule," Working Papers 62, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Federico Sturzenegger & Mariano Tommasi, 1992. ""Deadlock" Societies, The Allocation of Time and Growth Performance," UCLA Economics Working Papers 660, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1999.
"Gerontocracy, retirement, and social security,"
Economics Working Papers
383, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1999. "Gerontocracy, Retirement, and Social Security," NBER Working Papers 7117, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- DeBoer, Larry & McNamara, Kevin T. & Cranfield, John & Graham, Thea, 2000. "Legislator Influence and Public School Finance," The Review of Regional Studies, Southern Regional Science Association, vol. 30(2), pages 117-135, Fall.
- Mulligan, Casey B. & Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, 1999. "Gerontocracy, Retirement, and Social Security," Working Papers 154, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
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