The impact of monitoring on politicians’ attendance: Evidence from the Swiss Upper House
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105235
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More about this item
Keywords
Attendance; Absenteeism; Monitoring; Transparency; Voting; Parliament;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
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