Do Politicians Shirk when Reelection Is Certain? Evidence from the German Parliament
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Cited by:
- Arnold, Felix & Kauder, Björn & Potrafke, Niklas, 2014.
"Outside earnings, absence, and activity: Evidence from German parliamentarians,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 147-157.
- Felix Arnold & Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke, 2014. "Outside Earnings, Absence, and Activity: Evidence from Germany Parliamentarians," CESifo Working Paper Series 4900, CESifo.
- repec:diw:diwwpp:dp1340 is not listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Accountability ; Political Competition ; Quality of Politicians ; Rent-Seeking ; Absences;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2013-07-28 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2013-07-28 (Positive Political Economics)
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