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Efficient and truthful multi-attribute auctions for crowdsourced delivery

Author

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  • Xiao, Fei
  • Wang, Haijun
  • Guo, Shuojia
  • Guan, Xu
  • Liu, Baoshan

Abstract

Crowdsourced delivery is an emerging parcel delivery paradigm that leverages occasional couriers’ excess capacities to transport goods. In a crowdsourced delivery system, couriers offer their excess trip capacities to requesters with packages of different weights and distinct valuations for the service. This paper studies the truthful and efficient multi-attribute auction design for the crowdsourced delivery. We develop a second-preferred-score and a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves score (VCG-score) auctions for both single-unit and multi-unit multi-attribute cases, where price and weight are jointly evaluated when assigning package delivery tasks. The proposed auctions lead to truthful private valuation revelation and social welfare maximization. Computational analyses show that our proposed multi-attribute auctions outperform the single-attribute auction and the fixed rate mechanism in maximizing social welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiao, Fei & Wang, Haijun & Guo, Shuojia & Guan, Xu & Liu, Baoshan, 2021. "Efficient and truthful multi-attribute auctions for crowdsourced delivery," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 240(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:proeco:v:240:y:2021:i:c:s0925527321002097
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108233
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    Cited by:

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    6. Yu, Hao & Huang, Min & Chao, Xiuli & Yue, Xiaohang, 2022. "Truthful multi-attribute multi-unit double auctions for B2B e-commerce logistics service transactions," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 164(C).
    7. Wang, Yi-Jia & Wang, Yue & Huang, George Q. & Lin, Ciyun, 2024. "Public acceptance of crowdsourced delivery from a customer perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 317(3), pages 793-805.

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