Multi-dimensional procurement auction under uncertain and asymmetric information
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2016.09.060
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Guang-Xin Gao, 2018. "Sustainable Winner Determination for Public-Private Partnership Infrastructure Projects in Multi-Attribute Reverse Auctions," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(11), pages 1-20, November.
- Kerkhove, L.-P. & Vanhoucke, M., 2017. "A parallel multi-objective scatter search for optimising incentive contract design in projects," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 261(3), pages 1066-1084.
- Marchant, T. & Mishra, D., 2018. "The characterization of affine maximizers on restricted domains with two alternatives," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 266(3), pages 1038-1043.
- Qian, Cheng & Anderson, Edward, 2020. "Buyer’s optimal information revelation strategy in procurement auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 283(3), pages 1011-1025.
- Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2020. "Competitive bidding in asymmetric multidimensional public procurement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 282(1), pages 211-220.
- Qian, Xiaohu & Fang, Shu-Cherng & Huang, Min & Wang, Xingwei, 2019. "Winner determination of loss-averse buyers with incomplete information in multiattribute reverse auctions for clean energy device procurement," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 276-292.
- Zhe Chen, 2021. "The bid orchestration and competitions in scoring procurement auctions," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(7), pages 1718-1729, October.
- Zhe Chen, 2021. "The multidimensional procurement auctions with reference‐based utility," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(2), pages 319-325, March.
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Keywords
Auctions/bidding; Information asymmetry; Uncertainty modelling; Quality and cost uncertainty; Strictly proper scoring rules;All these keywords.
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