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Political connections and post-disaster assistance in rural Vietnam

Author

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  • Trinh, Trong-Anh
  • Feeny, Simon
  • Posso, Alberto

Abstract

Political connections have been shown to lead to corruption, favouritism and the pursuit of self-interests. They can therefore serve as an impediment to development and poverty reduction. This study examines whether having political connections is associated with post-disaster support from government authorities in the case of Vietnam. Using commune level data for the period 2012 to 2014 and a number of alternative econometric specifications, it finds that communes with higher levels of connections at the district level have a higher probability of receiving support in a post-shock period. The type of political connections is found to be important. We find a strong impact of political connections when household members are officials themselves or when households have relatives as officials. Having friends as officials does not appear to impact the likelihood of receiving assistance. The impacts are also greater when households have siblings, offspring or cousins working in government, but no evidence is found when officials are parents. Finally, having connections with district leaders is more important than connections with district officials.

Suggested Citation

  • Trinh, Trong-Anh & Feeny, Simon & Posso, Alberto, 2022. "Political connections and post-disaster assistance in rural Vietnam," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:72:y:2022:i:c:s0176268021000859
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102097
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political connections; Natural disasters; Disaster assistance; Vietnam;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • H84 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Disaster Aid

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