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Are politically connected firms less constrained in credit markets?

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  • John Rand

Abstract

Utilizing a panel of over 2,000 Vietnamese SMEs over a 10-year period, we analyse the importance of being politically connected on both access and cost-of-credit obtained from formal financial institutions. Controlling for unobserved time-invariant firm-level heterogeneity, productivity self-selection concerns, and access to alternative credit markets, we show that political connections decreases the likelihood of being credit-constrained by 4 percentage points.

Suggested Citation

  • John Rand, 2017. "Are politically connected firms less constrained in credit markets?," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2017-200, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2017-200
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Markussen, Thomas & Ngo, Quang-Thanh, 2019. "Economic and non-economic returns to communist party membership in Vietnam," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 370-384.
    2. Markussen, Thomas & Ngo, Quang-Thanh, 2019. "Economic and non-economic returns to communist party membership in Vietnam," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 370-384.

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