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Revolutionary origins and conditional mobilization

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  • McCormick, Gordon H.
  • Owen, Guillermo

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  • McCormick, Gordon H. & Owen, Guillermo, 1996. "Revolutionary origins and conditional mobilization," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 377-402, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:12:y:1996:i:3:p:377-402
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kuran, Timur, 1991. "The East European Revolution of 1989: Is It Surprising That We Were Surprised?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 121-125, May.
    2. Cho, In-Koo & Sobel, Joel, 1990. "Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 381-413, April.
    3. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    4. Timur Kuran, 1989. "Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 41-74, April.
    5. Muller, Edward N. & Opp, Karl-Dieter, 1986. "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(2), pages 471-487, June.
    6. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Koster, M. & Lindelauf, R. & Lindner, I. & Owen, G., 2008. "Mass-mobilization with noisy conditional beliefs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 55-77, January.
    2. Apolte, Thomas, 2015. "Abused rebels and winning coalitions: Regime change under the pressure of rebellions," CIW Discussion Papers 1/2015, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
    3. Apolte, Thomas, 2022. "Mass protests, security-elite defection, and revolution," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 981-996.

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