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Bilaterally-agree partner switching promotes cooperation in social dilemmas

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  • Yang, Yimei
  • Sun, Hao
  • Xu, Genjiu

Abstract

We investigate the evolution of cooperation with a bilaterally-agree partner switching mechanism in which two players rather than one determine whether to break a link. In this mechanism, we define an edge game to describe this bilateral consultation process. Through analyzing the Pure Nash Equilibrium of this game, we find that defectors intend to keep in touch with cooperators while cooperators prefer to break links with defectors in most cases. However, introducing such a mechanism results in that a defector would transfer part of his payoff to his cooperative neighbors conditionally, which maintains the link between cooperators and defectors. Besides, this transfer narrows the payoff gap between the two types of players and therefore promotes the propagation of cooperation. Our results highlight the importance of consultation on the realization of global cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Yang, Yimei & Sun, Hao & Xu, Genjiu, 2022. "Bilaterally-agree partner switching promotes cooperation in social dilemmas," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 585(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:585:y:2022:i:c:s0378437121007251
    DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2021.126452
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    Cited by:

    1. Yang, Yimei & Sun, Hao & Yang, Guangjing & Sun, Yanru, 2024. "Bilateral negotiation facilitates stable coexistence of cooperation with defection in Prisoner's Dilemma game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 471(C).
    2. Yang, Yimei & Sun, Hao & Hou, Dongshuang, 2023. "Heterogeneous negotiation undermines cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 622(C).

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