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Some results on ethnic conflicts based on evolutionary game simulation

Author

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  • Qin, Jun
  • Yi, Yunfei
  • Wu, Hongrun
  • Liu, Yuhang
  • Tong, Xiaonian
  • Zheng, Bojin

Abstract

The force of the ethnic separatism, essentially originating from the negative effect of ethnic identity, is damaging the stability and harmony of multiethnic countries. In order to eliminate the foundation of the ethnic separatism and set up a harmonious ethnic relationship, some scholars have proposed a viewpoint: ethnic harmony could be promoted by popularizing civic identity. However, this viewpoint is discussed only from a philosophical prospective and still lacks support of scientific evidences. Because ethnic group and ethnic identity are products of evolution and ethnic identity is the parochialism strategy under the perspective of game theory, this paper proposes an evolutionary game simulation model to study the relationship between civic identity and ethnic conflict based on evolutionary game theory. The simulation results indicate that: (1) the ratio of individuals with civic identity has a negative association with the frequency of ethnic conflicts; (2) ethnic conflict will not die out by killing all ethnic members once for all, and it also cannot be reduced by a forcible pressure, i.e., increasing the ratio of individuals with civic identity; (3) the average frequencies of conflicts can stay in a low level by promoting civic identity periodically and persistently.

Suggested Citation

  • Qin, Jun & Yi, Yunfei & Wu, Hongrun & Liu, Yuhang & Tong, Xiaonian & Zheng, Bojin, 2014. "Some results on ethnic conflicts based on evolutionary game simulation," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 406(C), pages 203-213.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:406:y:2014:i:c:p:203-213
    DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2014.03.049
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bester, Helmut & Guth, Werner, 1998. "Is altruism evolutionarily stable?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 193-209, February.
    2. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2001. "Preference Evolution and Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 273-297, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nathan Berg & Jeong-Yoo Kim & Kyu Min Lee, 2021. "Why is parochialism prevalent?: an evolutionary approach," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 16(4), pages 769-796, October.

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