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The impact of shareholding structure on firm investment: Evidence from Chinese listed companies

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  • Chen, Alex A.
  • Cao, Hong
  • Zhang, Dayong
  • Dickinson, David G.

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of shareholding concentration and the class of shareholders on firm investment. We apply the Euler equation approach to the empirical modeling of investment for a panel dataset of 786 Chinese listed companies during 1998–2004. We find that a significant positive sensitivity of investment to internal funds is associated with firms that have a low level of shareholding concentration, large proportion of state shares and low proportion of publicly-owned shares. We find that cash flow is insignificant for high levels of legal person or public shareholding. We interpret this in the context of the impact of both liquidity constraints and corporate governance issues.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Alex A. & Cao, Hong & Zhang, Dayong & Dickinson, David G., 2013. "The impact of shareholding structure on firm investment: Evidence from Chinese listed companies," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 85-100.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:25:y:2013:i:c:p:85-100
    DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2013.08.002
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    6. Kebin Deng & Zhong Ding & Yushu Zhu & Qing Zhou & Kathy Walsh, 2017. "Investment–cash flow sensitivity measures investment thirst, but not financial constraint," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 57(1), pages 165-197, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Firm investment; Shareholding structure; Corporate governance; China economic reform;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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