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Congressional influence on U.S. monetary policy: A reconsideration of the evidence

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  • Chopin, Marc C.
  • Cole, C. Steven
  • Ellis, Michael A.

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  • Chopin, Marc C. & Cole, C. Steven & Ellis, Michael A., 1996. "Congressional influence on U.S. monetary policy: A reconsideration of the evidence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 561-570, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:38:y:1996:i:3:p:561-570
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pierce, James L., 1978. "The myth of congressional supervision of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 363-370, April.
    2. Toma, Mark, 1991. "The demise of the public-interest model of the Federal Reserve System : A review essay," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 157-163, February.
    3. Richard E. Wagner, 1986. "Central Banking and the Fed: A Public Choice Perspective," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 6(2), pages 519-543, Fall.
    4. Grier, Kevin B., 1991. "Congressional influence on U.S. monetary policy : An empirical test," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 201-220, October.
    5. Havrilesky, Thomas, 1988. "Monetary Policy Signaling from the Administration to the Federal Reserve," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(1), pages 83-101, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Niklas Potrafke, 2018. "Government ideology and economic policy-making in the United States—a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 145-207, January.
    2. Michael Ellis & D. Eric Schansberg, 2000. "The determinants of tenure on the Federal Reserve Board of Governors: should I stay or should I go?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(2), pages 231-237.
    3. Dodge Cahan & Luisa Doerr & Niklas Potrafke, 2019. "Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 215-238, December.
    4. Katrin Wölfel & Christoph S. Weber, 2017. "Searching for the Fed’s reaction function," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 191-227, February.
    5. Gregory D. Hess & Cameron A. Shelton, 2016. "Congress and the Federal Reserve," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(4), pages 603-633, June.
    6. Grier, Kevin B., 1996. "Congressional oversight committee influence on U.S. monetary policy revisited," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 571-579, December.
    7. Niklas Potrafke, 2017. "Government Ideology and Economic Policy-Making in the United States," CESifo Working Paper Series 6444, CESifo.

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