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Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model

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  • Lahiri, Abhinaba
  • Peters, Hans
  • Storcken, Ton

Abstract

We consider the joint decision of placing public bads in each of two neighboring countries, modeled by two adjacent line segments. Residents of the two countries have single-dipped preferences, determined by the distance of their dips to the nearer public bad (myopic preferences) or, lexicographically, by the distance to the nearer and the other public bad (lexmin preferences). A (social choice) rule takes a profile of reported preferences as input and assigns the location of the public bad in each country. For the case of myopic preferences, all rules satisfying strategy-proofness, country-wise Pareto optimality, non-corruptibility, and the far away condition are characterized. These rules pick only border locations. The same holds for lexmin preferences under strategy-proofness and country-wise Pareto optimality alone.

Suggested Citation

  • Lahiri, Abhinaba & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2017. "Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 150-159.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:150-159
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.07.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2021. "A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    2. Peters, Hans & Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup & Storcken, Ton, 2017. "An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 84-90.
    3. Dietzenbacher, Bas & Tamura, Yuki, 2023. "Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    4. Doudou Gong & Bas Dietzenbacher & Hans Peters, 2024. "Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(3), pages 789-813, November.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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