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Dictatorship on Top-circular Domains

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  • Achuthankutty, Gopakumar
  • Roy, Souvik

Abstract

We consider domains with a natural property called top-circularity. We show that if such a domain satisfies either the maximal conflict property or the weak conflict property, then it is dictatorial. We obtain the result in Sato (2010) as a corollary. Further, it follows from our results that the union of a top-connected single-peaked domain and a top-connected single-dipped domain is dictatorial.

Suggested Citation

  • Achuthankutty, Gopakumar & Roy, Souvik, 2017. "Dictatorship on Top-circular Domains," MPRA Paper 81368, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:81368
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Oihane Gallo & Marc Vorsatz, 2023. "Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences," Papers 2303.05781, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    2. Felix Brand & Patrick Lederer & Sascha Tausch, 2023. "Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes on Super Condorcet Domains," Papers 2302.12140, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dictatorial domains; Top-circularity; Maximal conflict property; Weak conflict property;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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