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Power measures derived from the sequential query process

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  • Pritchard, Geoffrey
  • Reyhani, Reyhaneh
  • Wilson, Mark C.

Abstract

We study a basic sequential model for the formation of winning coalitions in a simple game, well known from its use in defining the Shapley–Shubik power index. We derive in a uniform way a family of measures of collective and individual decisiveness in simple games, and show that, as for the Shapley–Shubik index, they extend naturally to measures for TU-games. These individual measures, which we call weighted semivalues, form a class whose intersection with that of the class of weak semivalues yields the class of all semivalues.

Suggested Citation

  • Pritchard, Geoffrey & Reyhani, Reyhaneh & Wilson, Mark C., 2013. "Power measures derived from the sequential query process," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 174-180.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:65:y:2013:i:3:p:174-180
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.11.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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