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Should social network structure be taken into account in elections?

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  • Conitzer, Vincent

Abstract

If the social network structure among the voters in an election is known, how should this be taken into account by the voting rule? In this brief article, I argue, via the maximum likelihood approach to voting, that it is optimal to ignore the social network structure altogether—one person, one vote.

Suggested Citation

  • Conitzer, Vincent, 2012. "Should social network structure be taken into account in elections?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 100-102.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:64:y:2012:i:1:p:100-102
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.03.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mohamed Drissi-Bakhkhat & Michel Truchon, 2004. "Maximum likelihood approach to vote aggregation with variable probabilities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(2), pages 161-185, October.
    2. Nitzan, Shmuel & Paroush, Jacob, 1982. "Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(2), pages 289-297, June.
    3. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 34-45, March.
    4. Truchon, Michel, 2008. "Borda and the maximum likelihood approach to vote aggregation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 96-102, January.
    5. Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-424, June.
    6. Peyton Young, 1995. "Optimal Voting Rules," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 51-64, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Md Safiullah & Pramod Pathak & Saumya Singh & Ankita Anshul, 2016. "Social Media In Managing Political Advertising: A Study Of India," Polish Journal of Management Studies, Czestochowa Technical University, Department of Management, vol. 13(2), pages 121-130, June.
    2. Michael P. Cameron & Patrick Barrett & Bob Stewardson, 2013. "Can Social Media Predict Election Results? Evidence from New Zealand," Working Papers in Economics 13/08, University of Waikato.
    3. Athanassoglou, Stergios, 2013. "Multidimensional welfare rankings," MPRA Paper 51642, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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