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A solution for abstract decision problems based on maximum flow value

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  • Gori, Michele

Abstract

An abstract decision problem is an ordered pair where the first component is a nonempty and finite set of alternatives from which a society has to make a choice and the second component is an irreflexive relation on that set representing a dominance relation. A crucial problem is to find a reasonable solution that allows to select, for any given abstract decision problem, some of the alternatives. A variety of solutions have been proposed over the years. In this paper we propose a new solution, called maximum flow value set, that naturally stems from the work by Bubboloni and Gori (The flow network method, Social Choice and Welfare 51, pp. 621–656, 2018) and that is based on the concept of maximum flow value in a digraph. We analyze its properties and its relation with other solutions such as the core, the admissible set, the uncovered set, the Copeland set and the generalized stable set. We also show that the maximum flow value set allows to define a new Condorcet social choice correspondence strictly related to the Copeland social choice correspondence and fulfilling lots of desirable properties.

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  • Gori, Michele, 2024. "A solution for abstract decision problems based on maximum flow value," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 24-37.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:130:y:2024:i:c:p:24-37
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.05.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michele Gori, 2023. "Families of abstract decision problems whose admissible sets intersect in a singleton," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(1), pages 131-154, July.
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