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Aggregation of ranked categories

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  • Craven, John

Abstract

We consider the aggregation of classifications of objects that are graded in a single dimension into categories that are ranked. Grading is a sufficient domain restriction to avoid dictatorship. In contrast to other results, it is possible to use a majority-based aggregator when objects can be located in any number of categories. The aggregator locates an object below a boundary between specified categories just if a majority do so. In contrast, preponderance aggregators that are directly based on locations of objects can locate a higher graded object in a lower ranked category. Any aggregator that satisfies other independence conditions relating to the locations of objects or positions of boundaries must be dictatorial.

Suggested Citation

  • Craven, John, 2024. "Aggregation of ranked categories," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 27-33.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:129:y:2024:i:c:p:27-33
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.03.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter C. Fishburn, 2002. "Acyclic sets of linear orders: A progress report," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(2), pages 431-447.
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    4. Cho, Wonki Jo & Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2017. "Multinary group identification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
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