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On the consistency of random serial dictatorship

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  • Han, Xiang

Abstract

The random serial dictatorship (RSD) can be generalized to indivisible object allocation problems allowing fractional endowments such that symmetry, ex-post efficiency and strategy-proofness are preserved. However, there exists a consistent extension of RSD if and only if the population is less than four. The inconsistency of the generalized RSD is a common feature of strategy-proof rules that satisfy minimal fairness and efficiency properties: symmetry, ex-post efficiency, consistency and strategy-proofness are not compatible.

Suggested Citation

  • Han, Xiang, 2016. "On the consistency of random serial dictatorship," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 168-171.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:145:y:2016:i:c:p:168-171
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.06.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Consistency; Random serial dictatorship; Random assignment; Strategy-proofness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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