On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0621-7
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- Peters, H.J.M. & Roy, S. & Storcken, A.J.A., 2009. "On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules," Research Memorandum 060, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
References listed on IDEAS
- Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2009. "Gains from manipulating social choice rules," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(3), pages 349-371, September.
- Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 2010.
"Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting,"
Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), Handbook on Approval Voting, chapter 0, pages 19-37,
Springer.
- Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
- Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin & Fabrice Valognes, 2010.
"On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives,"
Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), Handbook on Approval Voting, chapter 0, pages 255-283,
Springer.
- Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin & Fabrice Valognes, 2010. "On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives," Post-Print halshs-00533124, HAL.
- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
- M. Remzi Sanver, 2010. "Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), Handbook on Approval Voting, chapter 0, pages 469-481, Springer.
- Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 1998. "The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 271-283, April.
- Pritchard, Geoffrey & Wilson, Mark C., 2009. "Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 35-57, July.
- Peter Fristrup & Hans Keiding, 1998. "Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 455-467.
- Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2007.
"Minimal manipulability: Unanimity and nondictatorship,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(6), pages 675-691, August.
- Maus, S. & Peters, H.J.M. & Storcken, A.J.A., 2004. "Minimal manipulability: unanimity and non-dictatorship," Research Memorandum 006, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Saari, Donald G, 1990. "Susceptibility to Manipulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 21-41, January.
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
- Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), 2010. "Handbook on Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer, number 978-3-642-02839-7, June.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Elkind, Edith & Grandi, Umberto & Rossi, Francesca & Slinko, Arkadii, 2020. "Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in k-approval voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 193-205.
- Yuliya Veselova, 2016.
"The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(3), pages 609-638, March.
- Yuliya Veselova, 2012. "The difference between manipulability indexes in IC and IANC models," HSE Working papers WP BRP 17/EC/2012, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
- Bednay, Dezső & Moskalenko, Anna & Tasnádi, Attila, 2019.
"Dictatorship versus manipulability,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 72-76.
- Bednay, Dezső & Moskalenko, Anna & Tasnádi, Attila, 2018. "Dictatorship versus manipulability," Corvinus Economics Working Papers (CEWP) 2018/09, Corvinus University of Budapest.
- Bednay, Dezsö & Moskalenko, Anna & Tasnádi, Attila, 2018. "Dictatorship versus manipulability," Working Papers 2072/351579, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- Yuliya A. Veselova, 2020. "Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability?," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 523-548, June.
- Conal Duddy & Ashley Piggins & William Zwicker, 2016.
"Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(2), pages 301-333, February.
- Duddy, Conal & Piggins, Ashley & Zwicker, William, 2014. "Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach," MPRA Paper 62071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Duddy, Conal, 2014. "Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: An impossibility result," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 14-16.
- Abdelhalim El Ouafdi & Dominique Lepelley & Jérôme Serais & Hatem Smaoui, 2022. "Comparing the manipulability of approval, evaluative and plurality voting with trichotomous preferences," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 2(8), pages 1-22, August.
- Yuliya A. Veselova, 2016. "Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability?," HSE Working papers WP BRP 152/EC/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
- Sato, Norihisa, 2019. "Approval voting and fixed electorate with dichotomous preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 51-60.
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