Non-vetoed matching with status quo
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102965
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Julien Combe & Olivier Tercieux & Camille Terrier, 2022.
"The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(6), pages 3154-3222.
- Julien Combe & Olivier Tercieux & Camille Terrier, 2022. "The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03917996, HAL.
- Julien Combe & Olivier Tercieux & Camille Terrier, 2022. "The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence," Post-Print halshs-03917996, HAL.
- John Kennes Jr. & Daniel Monte Jr. & Norovsambuu Tumennasan Jr., 2014. "The Day Care Assignment: A Dynamic Matching Problem," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 362-406, November.
- Julien Combe & Jan Christoph Schlegel, 2021. "Reallocation with Priorities," Working Papers 2021-09, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Pablo Guillen & Onur Kesten, 2012.
"Matching Markets With Mixed Ownership: The Case For A Real‐Life Assignment Mechanism,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(3), pages 1027-1046, August.
- Guillen, Pablo & Kesten, Onur, 2010. "Matching Markets with Mixed Ownership: The Case for A Real-life Assignment Mechanism," Working Papers 2010-01, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
- Pereyra, Juan Sebastián, 2013.
"A dynamic school choice model,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 100-114.
- Juan Sebastián Pereyra, 2011. "A dynamic school choice model," Serie documentos de trabajo del Centro de Estudios Económicos 2011-05, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos.
- Morimitsu Kurino, 2014. "House Allocation with Overlapping Generations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 258-289, February.
- John William Hatfield & Fuhito Kojima, 2008. "Matching with Contracts: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 1189-1194, June.
- John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom, 2005.
"Matching with Contracts,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 913-935, September.
- Paul Milgrom, 2003. "Matching with Contracts," Working Papers 03003, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Julien Combe & Umut Mert Dur & Olivier Tercieux & Camille Terrier & M. Utku Ünver, 2022. "Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re)assignment: An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1050, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
- Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October.
- Hylland, Aanund & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1979. "The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(2), pages 293-314, April.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Hu, Gaoji & Li, Jiangtao, 2024. "Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
- Anno, Hidekazu & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2016. "On the operation of multiple matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 166-185.
- Morimitsu Kurino, 2014. "House Allocation with Overlapping Generations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 258-289, February.
- Julien Combe, 2023.
"Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(2), pages 551-584, August.
- Julien Combe, 2022. "Reallocation with Priorities and Minimal Envy Mechanisms," Post-Print hal-03951678, HAL.
- Hafalir, Isa E. & Kojima, Fuhito & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2022.
"Interdistrict school choice: A theory of student assignment,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
- Isa Hafalir & Fuhito Kojima & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2018. "Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 970, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Isa E. Hafalir & Fuhito Kojima & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2018. "Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment," Papers 1812.11297, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2019.
- Monte, Daniel & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2015.
"Centralized allocation in multiple markets,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 74-85.
- Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2012. "Centralized Allocation in Multiple Markets," Economics Working Papers 2012-09, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
- Monte, Daniel & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2013. "Centralized allocation in multiple markets," Textos para discussão 322, FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil).
- Hugh-Jones, David & Kurino, Morimitsu & Vanberg, Christoph, 2014.
"An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 367-380.
- Hugh-Jones, David & Kurino, Morimitsu & Vanberg, Christoph, 2013. "An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-204, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Combe, Julien & Schlegel, Jan Christoph, 2024. "Reallocation with priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 287-299.
- Kotowski, Maciej H., 2015. "A Note on Stability in One-to-One, Multi-period Matching Markets," Working Paper Series rwp15-042, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Julien Combe & Umut Mert Dur & Olivier Tercieux & Camille Terrier & M. Utku Ünver, 2022. "Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re)assignment: An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1050, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Dimakopoulos, Philipp D. & Heller, C.-Philipp, 2019. "Matching with waiting times: The German entry-level labor market for lawyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 289-313.
- Kadam, Sangram V. & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2018.
"Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 1-20.
- Kadam, Sangram V. & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2015. "Time Horizons, Lattice Structures, and Welfare in Multi-period Matching Markets," Working Paper Series rwp15-031, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2023.
"When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1145-1173, November.
- Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2018. "When Does an Additional Stage Improve Welfare in Centralized Assignment?," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 18/704, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Ivan Balbuzanov & Maciej H. Kotowski, 2019.
"Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(5), pages 1663-1692, September.
- Balbuzanov, Ivan & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2017. "Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange," Working Paper Series rwp17-016, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Bettina Klaus & David F. Manlove & Francesca Rossi, 2014. "Matching under Preferences," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 14.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Kesten, Onur, 2009. "Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2209-2226, September.
- Kojima, Fuhito, 2013. "Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 1-14.
- Imamura, Kenzo & Kawase, Yasushi, 2024. "Efficient matching under general constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 197-207.
- Alvin Roth, 2008.
"Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.
- Alvin E Roth, 2007. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000283, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Roth, Alvin, 2008. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," Scholarly Articles 2579651, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alvin E. Roth, 2007. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," NBER Working Papers 13225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bando, Keisuke & Kawasaki, Ryo, 2024. "Stability and substitutability in multi-period matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 533-553.
More about this item
Keywords
Non-vetoed; Conditional stability; Efficiency; Matching; Mechanism; Strategy-proofness;All these keywords.
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:111:y:2024:i:c:s0304406824000272. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.