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Conflicts in regular networks

Author

Listed:
  • Huang, Ying
  • Jiao, Qian
  • Shen, Bo
  • Sun, Xiang

Abstract

This paper considers a regular conflict network model with the returns to scale technology. Agents are asymmetric in terms of their effort costs. We show that the impact of the returns to scale technology on agents’ behaviors crucially depends on the cost asymmetry among agents. When the cost asymmetry is sufficiently high, both individual total efforts and the conflict intensity can have an inverted U relationship with the level of returns to scale.

Suggested Citation

  • Huang, Ying & Jiao, Qian & Shen, Bo & Sun, Xiang, 2023. "Conflicts in regular networks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:106:y:2023:i:c:s0304406823000204
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102827
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    References listed on IDEAS

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