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Tradable planning permits in the field: Executive experimental results from Germany

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  • Henger, Ralph
  • Straub, Tim
  • Weinhardt, Christof

Abstract

In countries such as Germany, where municipalities have planning sovereignty, problems of urban sprawl often arise. As the dynamics of land development have not substantially subsided over the last years, the national government decided to test the instrument of ‘Tradable Planning Permits’ (TPP) in a nationwide field experiment with 87 municipalities involved. The field experiment was able to implement the key features of a TPP system in a laboratory setting with approximated real socioeconomic and planning conditions. In a TPP system allocated planning permits must be used by municipalities for developing land. The permits can be traded between local jurisdictions, so that they have flexibility in deciding how to comply with the regulation. In order to evaluate the performance of such a system, specific field data about future building areas and their impact on community budgets for the period 2014–2028 were collected. The field experiment contains several sessions with representatives of the municipalities and with students. The participants were confronted with two (municipalities) and four (students) schemes. The results show that a trading system can curb down land development in an effective and also efficient manner. However, depending on the regulatory framework, the trading schemes show different price developments and distributional effects. The unexperienced representatives of the local authorities can easily handle with the permits in the administration and in the established market. A trading scheme sets very high incentives to save open space and to direct development activities to areas within existing planning boundaries. It is therefore a promising instrument for Germany and also other regions or countries with an established land-use planning system.

Suggested Citation

  • Henger, Ralph & Straub, Tim & Weinhardt, Christof, 2023. "Tradable planning permits in the field: Executive experimental results from Germany," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:lauspo:v:127:y:2023:i:c:s026483772300025x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2023.106559
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    References listed on IDEAS

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