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Is there an anticorruption agenda in utilities?

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  • Kenny, Charles

Abstract

In a networked utility setting (few, predominantly monopoly providers), it is very hard to measure the extent of grand corruption using perceptions or surveys. It is even harder to measure the extent of damage done specifically by corruption, petty or grand. As a result, it will be hard to develop "actionable indicators" of, or to develop empirically tested responses to, corruption in utilities. How much does this matter? Corruption is the result of a failure of governance. We can measure the impact of poor governance at the level of the utility, and we have a number of tools to improve their governance. It is not clear that, at the sectoral or company level, there is a significant anticorruption agenda not encompassed by this broader agenda of improved governance. To that extent, the "new" anticorruption agenda provides renewed justification for the "old" focus on institutions at the level of utilities management, but does not require a radically different approach.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenny, Charles, 2009. "Is there an anticorruption agenda in utilities?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 156-165, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:17:y:2009:i:2:p:156-165
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Estache, Antonio & Wren-Lewis, Liam, 2010. "What Anti-Corruption Policy Can Learn from Theories of Sector Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8082, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Frédéric Boehm, 2011. "Is There an Anti-corruption Agenda in Regulation? Insights from Colombian and Zambian Water Regulation," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Søreide (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Berg, Sanford V. & Jiang, Liangliang & Lin, Chen, 2012. "Regulation and corporate corruption: New evidence from the telecom sector," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 22-43.

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